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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
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                    Plaintiff,
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                                              20 CV 4432 (JSR)
                 V.
                                              Trial
      JONATHAN BRAUN, et al,
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                    Defendants.
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                                              New York, N.Y.
9
                                              January 10, 2024
                                              9:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                            HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                                              -and a Jury-
                                APPEARANCES
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     FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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          Attorneys for Plaintiff
     BY: GREGORY ASHE
          JULIA HEALD
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     AIDALA BERTUNA & KAMINS PC
          Attorneys for Defendants
     BY: MICHAEL DIBENEDETTO
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     LAW OFFICES OF BARATTA, BARATTA & AIDALA
          Attorneys for Defendants
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     BY: JOSEPH BARATTA
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     Also Present:
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     Molly Smith, FTC Paralegal
     Ken Kotarski, FTC Trial Tech
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     Emma Barbacci, Defense Paralegal
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(Trial resumed; jury not present; case called) MR. DIBENEDETTO: Your Honor, before you bring in the jury, I wanted to remind you or inform the jury that all of the Kessef Capital documents are going to be removed. THE COURT: Yes. MR. ASHE: Do you want us to provide the clerk with the copies of the exhibits now or after? THE COURT: After. MR. ASHE: After closing. THE COURT: Yes. MR. ASHE: Okay. 

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Once again, thank you for your promptness.

In a minute, we're going to hear closing arguments.

There was one other evidentiary point I wanted to bring to your attention.

You may possibly recall that there were certain documents and portions of documents relating to an entity called Kessef. They were received subject to connection. The connection was never made, and so those have now been excluded. So we won't send in those exhibits to you, and anything you remember about those particular exhibits you should now put out of your mind. They are no longer part of the case.

So we're now going to hear closing arguments of counsel. Each side has been allotted up to an hour. They may not take that much. And you will recall that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, the FTC, so they will go first.

I should also mention before I forget it: Just as I told you in opening statements, nothing that counsel says is evidence. This is their opportunity to tell you what they think the evidence amounts to. The evidence is only the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits that were received, and the stipulated or the found facts, the undisputed facts I gave you yesterday in writing and read to you earlier.

Go ahead.

1 MR. ASHE: May I begin, your Honor?

THE COURT: Please.

MR. ASHE: Members of the jury, thank you for your time and your attention these past several days. I ask for your attention for just a little bit more.

My name is Gregory Ashe, and together with my colleague, Julia Heald, we represent the plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission, or the FTC, for the consumer.

The mission of the FTC is to protect consumers by enforcing the nation's consumer protection laws to ensure a free and fair marketplace, and that's what we're doing here.

We brought this case to protect a group of consumers, small businesses, small businesses trying to make a go at it, small businesses that needed money to operate, small businesses that, for whatever reason, were not able to obtain traditional financing. So they reached out to defendant Braun's company, Richmond Capital, to get what are called merchant cash advances.

Now, you heard evidence of how these merchant cash advances work. Richmond Capital and these small businesses entered into contracts called merchant agreements. Now, according to the merchant agreements, Richmond Capital would give these businesses an agreed amount of money called the total purchase price, and then make daily withdrawals from the businesses' bank accounts until Richmond Capital collected an

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agreed amount called the agreed total purchased amount. But that's not what happened.

Instead, in many instances, as the Court already found, Richmond Capital would deduct significant fees, sometimes without the consumers having any knowledge of those fees. Other times, consumers agreed to some fees. But Richmond Capital deducted even more than those agreed-upon fees, the result being that small businesses often receive significantly less funding than what was promised.

And, again, as the Court already found, in many instances, Richmond Capital kept making daily withdrawals from the businesses' bank account, even after the total purchased amount was paid. The result being that small businesses paid substantially more than what Richmond Capital promised to collect from them. Now, to stop these egregious practices, in June 2020, the FTC sued defendant Braun and Richmond Capital and several other defendants, two of whom you heard yesterday.

The FTC charged that the ways in which the defendants marketed, collected, and serviced their merchant agreements violated the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair deceptive acts or practices, and Section 521 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley, or the GLB Act, which prohibits making false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements in order to get someone's bank informers.

Now, I want to say again that the Court has already determined that defendant Braun violated the law. That is not

in dispute, and that is not something that you need to decide.

You are here to decide the amount of money that defendant Braun should pay for his violations.

There are two types of monetary relief that the FTC is seeking in this case: First, a consumer redress judgment, an amount to be returned to the small businesses based on the harm they suffered; and second, a type of fine called a civil penalty.

I'd like to start with the first type of money judgment that we are asking you to enter.

Because defendant Braun violated Section 21 of the GLB Act, Section 19 of the FTC Act allows for the entry of a monetary judgment to redress or remedy the harm to consumers caused by those violations. Now, the question for you is not whether consumer redress judgment should be entered, but how much that judgment should be.

As the Court will instruct you, the law requires that we demonstrate a reasonable estimate of that amount, the amount of the harm caused by the defendant's violations of the GLB Act. Then the burden is going to shift to defendant Braun to prove to you by a preponderance of the evidence that our estimate was not reasonable or inaccurate.

Now, the Court also is going to instruct you that the law requires that we prove our case by what's called a preponderance of the evidence; in other words, that it is more

likely than not true, our claims.

So I want you to imagine scales, and as long as the scales tip slightly in our favor, then the FTC has met its burden.

Now, Section 19 of the FTC Act, which governs the consumer redress, has what is called a three-year statute of limitations. That means we need to demonstrate to you the amount of consumer harm caused in the three years before we filed our complaint in June of 2020.

Now, remember when Dr. McAlvanah testified on Monday?

He testified about the amount of consumer harm caused by

defendant's over-collection and underfunding practices. Let's

start with the over-collection violations.

He testified that there was a total population of 918 deals where the defendants made withdrawals within the three-year period. Now, why did Dr. McAlvanah use those deals? Because as long as defendants were still making withdrawals, they are still telling small businesses they owe money even when this wasn't true, unless they're still violating the law.

Then Dr. McAlvanah described how based on his analysis of a statistically valid random sample of those 918 deals, the defendants over-collect 26.9 percent of the time, or 246 of those 918 deals. He also testified that it was statistically reasonable that the violation rate could be as high as 41 percent, or 376 out of those 918 deals. Dr. McAlvanah

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further testified that the average amount that was over-collected was \$9,397 per deal.

Now, if you multiply those numbers, the 376 deals with over-collections by the 9,397 per deal, the consumer injury caused by the over-collection practices was \$3,533,272.

Now, with respect to defendant's underfunding violations, remember, that's where they held back more in undisclosed, sometimes bogus, fees than what was promised.

Dr. McAlvanah testified there was a total population of 768 deals where the first withdraw was within the three-year period.

Why the different number? Because for underfunding, we're looking at the start of the merchant cash advance deal. That's the time that the defendant lied to small businesses about how much money they are going to receive.

Now, Dr. McAlvanah testified to you based on his analysis of a statistically valid random sample of those 768 deals that the defendants underfunded 47.4 percent of the time, or on 364 of those deals.

He also testified that it was statistically reasonable that the violation rate could be as high as 71.1 percent, or 546 deals. But Dr. McAlvanah further testified that the average amount underfunded was \$3,022 per deal. And if we multiply those numbers, the 546 deals with underfunding and the \$3,022 of underfunding per deal, that yields a consumer injury

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caused by the underfunding of \$1,650,012.

Now, as Dr. McAlvanah testified, these numbers are statistically reasonable. They are based on a random sample, a method that is scientifically valid and widely used in the field of economics.

You may wonder why the FTC used a random sample instead of looking at every deal. Well, as FTC investigator Ms. Kwok testified, finding the relevant data was a very laborious process requiring manual review of hundreds of documents from Richmond Capital that were not labeled or even organized. As you recall from Dr. McAlvanah, this was one of the very reasons that random samples are so widely used. I submit to you that the FTC has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the defendants caused a total of \$5,183,284 in consumer harm.

Now, under the law, the burden now shifts to defendant Braun to try to prove to you by a preponderance of the evidence that our numbers are not reasonable. And he has not shown you any evidence to suggest that the FTC's calculations are not reasonable. The defendants may try to argue that the FTC is trying to sneak in damages after December 2018 when Mr. Braun was supposedly fired from Richmond Capital, but there's been no evidence that he was ever fired or ever stopped controlling Richmond Capital.

In fact, the evidence shows, looking at

Richmond Capital's bank statements in Exhibit 45, that defendant Braun remained on Richmond Capital's bank statements dated December 31, 2018. And Ms. Kwok testified that the last deal in that database was in November 2018, a month before Mr. Braun was supposedly fired.

Now, defendant Braun may also try to argue that because Dr. McAlvanah did not personally review the underlying merchant cash advance agreements, that somehow his calculations are suspect.

As the Court reminded you, it's not uncommon for an expert to rely on information that has been provided by other people. Moreover, as you heard from Ms. Kwok, the spreadsheets that were provided to Dr. McAlvanah accurately reflected the data that was provided to Dr. McAlvanah, accurately reflected the data that were in the merchant agreements and the bank processing documents, and defendant Braun put on no evidence to suggest otherwise.

In fact, defendant Braun put on no evidence that the methodology by which Dr. McAlvanah drew the random sample was incorrect, or that the methodology by which he made his calculations was in error. Thus I submit to you, defendant Braun has failed to carry his burden, and that the FTC's calculations of \$5,183,284 in consumer harm is reasonable.

Now, when you begin your deliberations, the Court is going to give you a verdict form. This is what it's going to

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look like. The first question reads: We the jury award the FTC the following monetary damages from defendant Braun. based on the evidence, I respectfully ask that you enter \$5,183,284 in monetary damages on the verdict form.

I now want to turn to the second type of monetary judgment that the FTC is seeking, and that's civil penalties.

Now, because defendant Braun violated Section 521 of the GLB Act, Section 5 of the FTC Act, a different provision, allows for the entry of civil penalties if he acted knowingly.

As the Court will shortly instruct you, the FTC must first show that defendant Braun knew that material misrepresentations were being made with his consent about the amounts the defendants would provide to and collect from consumers; and second, that the FTC must show that the defendant, Braun, knew or should have known he was violating the GLB Act.

And as the Court will instruct, we do not need to prove actual knowledge. Instead, it is enough if a reasonable person in the same situation as defendant Braun would have known of the GLB Act. And the evidence is clear that it is more likely than not that defendant Braun, or a reasonable person in his shoes, knew or should have known that his conduct was prohibited by the GLB Act.

Now, you heard Ms. Kwok testify that Richmond Capital used a company called Actum Processing as its payment

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processor. She explained that a payment processer is a company that facilitates electronic payments between businesses and their customers. So Actum Processing is what enabled Richmond Capital to make those daily withdrawals from their customers.

As Ms. Kwok, who, as you heard, is a certified fraud examiner, explained merchant accounts are everything to a business, and without one, a business can't accept money from their customers.

Now, remember Exhibit 38, the client services application agreement that Richmond Capital signed? Richmond Capital agreed as a condition of having that critical merchant account to follow the GLB Act. And as the Court told you, defendant Braun admitted that he knew of this agreement. Another service, very important to Richmond Capital, was getting information about potential customers.

As you heard Mr. Reich testify, and he was a codefendant of Mr. Braun's, obtaining such information was important to merchant cash underwriters. Now, a company called Thomson Reuters provides this type of service in what are called CLEAR reports.

In 2014 and again in 2017, Richmond Capital signed an account validation and certification form, which was in Exhibit 39, to get access to these CLEAR reports to do its underwriting. Now, as part of that certification,

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1 Richmond Capital had to certify compliance with the GLB Act.

And Richmond Capital agreed as a condition to access these reports that it, and all authorized persons, would comply with the GLB Act.

Now Mr. Reich testified that underwriting used CLEAR reports. And defendant Braun previously testified that among his other duties, he was heavily involved in Richmond Capital's underwriting. Now, defendant Braun may argue he never signed these agreements, not even an officer of Richmond Capital. You know, he's right. He didn't sign the Actum Processing agreement or the Thomson Reuters agreements. But that fact is not relevant. It doesn't mean anything.

He may also argue that his name was nowhere to be found on Richmond Capital documents, like tax returns. While that may be true about the tax returns — though, we have not seen any evidence of it — what is true is that defendant Braun's name does appear over Richmond Capital's bank statements. You saw a few of them a few minutes ago. And his name appears from at least May 2016 all the way through December 2018.

Now, these bank documents, along with Mr. Giardina, one of his codefendants, testimony — and this is before he began invoking the Fifth Amendment, and Mr. Reich's testimony, they also show that the names, RCG Advances, Richmond Capital, RCG Advisory, these are interchangeable.

Now, the evidence shows even though defendant Braun was never named officer of Richmond Capital, that was

Mr. Giardina, he was the person in charge -- the person who made all the decisions, called the shots.

Remember, the Court has already determined that it is undisputed that Mr. Braun exercised considerable control over all the defendants in this case. As defendant Braun put it in his previous testimony, he was there five days a week from day one. Mr. Giardina was not. And you may draw an adverse inference from Mr. Giardina's taking the Fifth.

Now, as the Court explained, when a person takes the Fifth Amendment, you may, based on the relationship between that witness and defendant Braun, you may draw an inference that had he testified truthfully and not asserted the Fifth, that his answer would have incriminated Mr. Braun.

And so when Mr. Giardina was asked but refused to answer that he considered defendant Braun to be in charge of Richmond Capital, you may draw the adverse inference that he was. Same with when he was asked whether Braun was responsible for the day-to-day decisions concerning underwriting, funding, collections.

Mr. Reich testified to the same thing. And defendant Braun certainly made sure that his employees knew it.

If you look at an e-mail that was shown to you as Exhibit 51, he tells employees, who is allowed to decide how

much a merchant owes other than me? Or Exhibit 57, when an employee asks if they should consult with Mr. Giardina, defendant Braun response, lol, you still don't realize who is in charge.

And regarding the act of Thomson Reuters' agreements, you may draw an adverse inference from Mr. Giardina that Mr. Giardina signed them at the direction of defendant Braun. And not only signed them, but that defendant Braun instructed him how to complete the agreements. Not just those agreements, you may draw the adverse inference that even though Mr. Giardina was the authorized signatory on Richmond Capital's bank statements, as you can see in Exhibit 68, it was defendant Braun who directed him as to when and how much to deposit into consumers' bank accounts.

It was so understood by employees that Mr. Giardina did sign things for Mr. Braun that Mr. Braun didn't want done or signed in his own name, that when defendant Braun was considering a replacement — those CLEAR reports I mentioned earlier, one of his employees stated: Defendant Braun should request a free trial of the software, then she corrects herself, noting, well, Rob — that is Mr. Giardina — should request a free trial.

Now, QuarterSpot is another merchant cash advance company that Richmond Capital had an agreement with. The exhibit shows in Exhibit 40, that QuarterSpot sent directly to

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defendant Braun an amendment to that partner agreement. The cover e-mail to defendant Braun explained that the amendment reflected changes made to clarify and update the applicable laws and regulations governing that agreement. Now, the amendment itself requires that Richmond Capital represent that it had not been or was currently the subject of any investigation or legal proceeding relating to violations of the GLB Act.

Remember, this was sent directly to defendant Braun.

And what did he do with it? He forwarded that e-mail to

Mr. Giardina, telling him sign the contract amendment.

Mr. Reich testified that in addition to CLEAR reports, merchant cash advance companies also use another report called a TLO report to underwrite deals. He explained how useful TLO reports are to underwriting merchant cash advance deals. The TLO reports in Exhibit 43 in this example -- and this TLO reports warn that the reports may only be used in accordance with the GLB Act.

And remember from Mr. Braun's earlier testimony that he was heavily involved in underwriting at Richmond Capital?

Now, notice how often the GLB Act appears in all of these important documents, in the agreements for Richmond Capital's merchant accounts, in the agreements to get CLEAR reports for underwriting, in the QuarterSpot partner agreement, in the TLO requests.

Now, the defendant may try to argue that defendant

Braun has never heard of the GLB Act. But they never presented
any evidence of that. Use your common sense. A reasonable
person who consistently sees references to a statute, who time
and again instructs others to agree and affirm that
Richmond Capital would comply with that statute, that
reasonable person would find out what that statute requires
them to do or prohibits them from doing.

And what does Section 521 of the GLB Act say? It says you can't make false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements; in other words, you can't lie to get bank information. And the evidence clearly shows that defendant Braun knew he was not telling small businesses the truth about how much they would get in funding or how much Richmond Capital would collect from them.

The Court has already found that it is undisputed that the defendants misrepresented the amounts they would fund to consumers and collect from consumers. And defendant Braun often joked to his colleagues and employees in e-mails about what he was doing. For example, in Exhibit 62 where he says in one deal, we actually are overpaid \$6,000, so I went to contract for 10k, held back 2k in fees and 2k in refi, which he doesn't even owe. And then commenting, free ride lol, try and make extra money with no risk.

Or in Exhibit 65, this is another deal, where he ups

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the fees after the contract signing, stating, honestly, I do that when I can. It was signed at 4,999, then I changed it to 19,999, and 19,999, lol, because I smelled the opportunity. It's extra 30k. I got to do what I got to do.

Or this exchange in Exhibit 63 in which defendant Braun pretty much explained his MO when he says, I see your offers, then look at it clear and figure out what type of shady shit can I pull off.

Mr. Reich testified defendant Braun was a smart businessman, paid attention to detail. A smart businessperson is not going to jeopardize their payment processing account the lifeblood of their company - or jeopardize their access to reports essential to deciding whether to make new deals.

Ask yourselves, would a reasonable person, a smart businessperson who works with contracts daily, who pays attention to details, would that reasonable person fail to read contracts essential to keeping their business operating? A reasonable person in defendant Braun's position would have known, or should have known, that the GLB Act prohibited his lies to small businesses. In other words, the evidence clearly shows that it is more likely than not that the defendant Braun knew his conduct was prohibited by the GLB Act and that if he didn't know, he should have.

And on the verdict form that the Court is going to give you, on the second question, the FTC's claims for civil

penalties, do you, the jury, find the defendant acted knowingly, I respectfully ask that you check the box yes.

Finally, having found defendant Braun liable for civil penalties, you must determine what amount that penalty should be. As the Court will instruct you, first, you will need to determine how many times defendant Braun violated the law.

Then you will need to determine the appropriate amount of civil penalties for those violations. Under the FTC Act, penalties can be up to \$50,120 per violation.

Now, federal law says there is a five-year statute of limitations for civil penalties. Now, this is longer than the period for consumer redress that I discussed earlier. That means we need to determine to you, or demonstrate to you, the number of deals that defendants over-collected and underfunded in the five-year period before the FTC filed this case for purposes of civil penalties.

Remember, again, Dr. McAlvanah, he testified there was a total population of 1,499 deals within this five-year period. And with respect to defendants' over-collection violations, where they collected more from consumers than what was set forth in the merchant agreements, Dr. McAlvanah testified how based on his analysis of a statistically valid random sample of those 1,499 deals, that defendants over-collected 26.4 percent of the time, or 365 of those deals. He also testified that it was statistically reasonable that the violation rate could be

as high as 37 percent, 554 of those 1,499 deals.

And with respect to defendants' underfunding violations, Dr. McAlvanah testified that based on his analysis of the statistically valid random sample of those 1,499 deals, that the defendants underfunded 34.6 percent of the time, or around 519 of those deals. He also testified that it was statistically reasonable that the violation rate could be as high as 49.1 percent, or such 736 deals.

Adding the number of over-collection violations to the number of underfunded violations, the evidence shows it's more likely than not the defendants engaged in a total of 1,290 violations during the five-year period. So the last thing we are asking you to determine is the appropriate amount of civil penalties. And that's the number that's going to be multiplied by 1,290 to get the total civil penalty.

As you said, the FTC Act says that you can assess an amount up to \$50,120 per violation; in other words, any number between a penny and \$50,120. Now, keep in mind, the purpose of civil penalties is to both punish defendant Braun's unlawful conduct and to deter future violations by would-be fraudsters.

As the Court will instruct you, to help you determine the appropriate amount of civil penalties, you should consider several factors, including the degree of defendant Braun's culpability or responsibility for the violations, and any other merits you believe justice may require.

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When you review all the evidence you have seen, we ask that you conclude a civil penalty of \$50,120 per violation is the appropriate amount.

Now, the evidence is overwhelming that defendant Braun personally participated in the law violations, that his degree of culpability or responsibility is high. The evidence shows that even if he was never named officer, defendant Braun was the person in charge, the person who made all the decisions.

The Court has already found it is undisputed that he exercised considerable control over Richmond Capital. Mr. Reich testified to it. You may take the adverse inference from Mr. Giardina's taking the Fifth to it. And you have seen in Exhibits 51 and Exhibits 57, defendant Braun certainly made sure his employees knew it. And the evidence is overwhelming that defendant Braun personally directed and participated in defendants' unlawful over-collection and underfunding practices.

Now, the Court has already determined that it is undisputed that he personally participated in the over-collection and the scheme to not pay the promised funding. You heard in his own instructions to his own employees in e-mail. In Exhibit 51, telling them in one deal, I added 5k to the balance. Or in Exhibit 56 that he would add some extra. Or in Exhibit 62, that he added 2k refi, which the business didn't even owe. Or in Exhibit 65, that after contract

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signing, he changed the fees from the agreed, just under 5,000, to almost 40,000 because he smelled the opportunity. Or Exhibit 53, where he says we over-collected \$3,200 on the previous deal, lol. Or Exhibit 54, how he collected over 16,000 from a business. Or Exhibit 64, saying we're 13k overpaid in our last deal.

Finally, I ask you to consider -- and the evidence clearly demonstrates -- a few matters as justice may require. First, when defendant Braun collected on outstanding merchant cash advances, he used egregious practices. I'm not going to replay it, but you remember the video from yesterday. You heard it with your own ears, you saw it with your own eyes, how defendant Braun treats his customers.

And Exhibit 73, Mr. Reich admitted earlier in this case that the defendant Braun threatened his customers. When he was asked to admit whether defendant threatened customers with physical violence, Mr. Reich admitted at least on one occasion he did. Or if the defendant threatened to ruin the reputation of customers, he admitted he was aware of threats. Or if the defendant threatened or ruined personal property, he admitted that defendant Braun threatened harm in various ways to consumers.

And, finally, I want you to remember that defendant

Braun didn't just violate the law, he didn't just over-collect,

didn't just underfund. He enjoyed doing it. He relished in

the cruelty. The evidence shows time and again how defendant Braun made light of his illegal practices.

We're all familiar with the texting lingo L-O-L, laughing out loud. You can hear defendant Braun in his own words and e-mails to employees. In Exhibit 57, when asked, did you ever send him his 25k you reserved, he said nope, lollllll. Or in Exhibit 50, where he says, let's just leave on forever and over-collect, lol. Or Exhibit 53, where he says, we also over-collected 3,200 on the previous 5k deal, lol. Or Exhibit 54, I over-collected 16k, lol. Or Exhibit 60, lol, we are over 10k, and I'm running RCG, Viceroy, and RAM deals with this moron, lol. Or Exhibit 62, free ride, lol. Try and make extra money with no risk, lol. Or Exhibit 65, when asked, you changed the fees on this to 40k? He replies, yeah, lol.

As you can see, defendant Braun was laughing out loud a lot, as he either instructed his employees to over-collect or underfund, or he boasted about doing it. And he relished in the cruelty. The video just speaks for itself. Meanwhile, you can almost hear the glee in his voice, in e-mails, for example, in Exhibit 47, where he states, I ripped ass whole apart with 11k fee. Or Exhibit 56, where he says he's going to inflate a consumer's outstanding balance because consumer is annoying as hell. Or in Exhibit 61, where he boasts I'm going to beat this bitch at his own game, and they never thought they'd land on a slick motherfucker like me, and concluding, I'm going to get

paid and make yet again another grown man cry.

But one of his colleagues described defendant Braun's cruelty best in Exhibit 49, when she told him it's disgusting, you're ruining this guy's business, and you think it's funny.

So when you begin your deliberations, I ask that you remember these other matters, how serious they are, how important they are to affect justice. When you consider the overwhelming evidence that we have presented, including the extent to which defendant Braun is personally responsible and those important matters that justice requires, I ask that you impose the largest civil penalty allowed. Remember, the purpose of civil penalties is not just to punish defendant Braun, but to deter future violations by others, send the message that lies and deception will not be tolerated in the marketplace.

And on Question 3 of the verdict form that the Court will give you, multiplying 120,090, the number of times the defendants violated the GLB Act, by what we're asking you to enter, \$50,120, civil penalty per violation, I respectfully request that you require defendant Braun to pay a civil penalty of \$64,654,800.

You're next going to hear from the defendant's lawyer.

I ask that you give him the same time, attention, and

consideration that you gave me. Then the Court will give you

some final instructions, and when you go into the jury room to

begin your deliberations, I ask that you remember what I said. I ask that you remember the evidence that has been presented, I ask that you remember the testimony that you have heard, I ask that you remember the e-mails, the documents, the charts that you have seen, and I ask that you use your common sense, and I ask that you return a verdict for the FTC, a verdict for the consumer.

Thank you for your time, your attention, and your consideration.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. And now we'll hear from defense counsel.

MR. DIBENEDETTO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I want to first thank you for your time in this matter. My name is Michael DiBenedetto with Joseph Baratta. We represent the defendant, Jonathan Braun.

I want to say, it is important to remember that it is the burden of the FTC to prove their case, to prove these damages of nearly \$70 million against defendant Braun.

The plaintiff's counsel wants to set a precedent, deter others from committing these alleged heinous acts. You heard testimony from Mr. Reich yesterday, who is the owner of one of the corporate defendants who settled this matter for \$675,000. If you want to send a message to, quote/unquote, deter, deter other merchant cash advance companies from committing these alleged acts, and you settle for \$675,000 with

one codefendant and asking for 70 million against another, it seems a bit egregious to me.

The FTC has not provided any proof of consumer harm. The FTC focused on the Actum application, whether or not Mr. Braun had knowledge of the GLB Act. Where are the Actum records? Where are the records that show these alleged overpayments and underfunding? All of these debits that came out, where are those records? Where are those consumers in this courtroom today? No one came and testified. No one came and testified about these alleged threats that Mr. Braun supposedly made.

It is the FTC's burden to prove damages.

Mr. McAlvanah, who testified -- it's also important to remember

Mr. McAlvanah is employed by the Federal Trade Commission. He

testified that he was instructed by the staff attorneys on what

to do. He testified that he never saw any of the agreements.

He was given an Excel spreadsheet and said, have at it.

He also testified that he took a small random sample of the 1,499 deals and acknowledged that there's a wider margin of error. That is very important to understand. The one witness that they had to discuss damages acknowledged that there's a wide margin of error in his analysis.

For the FTC to ask for \$70 million, wouldn't it be important to conduct an analysis of the 1,499 deals, or something close to it, to shrink that margin of error, instead

of saying it's too laborious or burdensome to conduct that kind of analysis? You're asking for \$70 million, \$70 million.

There is not a bank record in evidence that shows the over-collecting. There isn't a bank record that shows the underfunding. There isn't a consumer in here that said anything of that sort. It's mere — here's a merchant cash advance agreement, and they want you to determine that that's worth \$70 million. It's not there.

Ms. Kwok testified, who was an investigator for the Federal Trade Commission. When cross-examined, she didn't seem to remember much. She didn't remember much. She was the investigator on this case. I asked her about the bank statements; she couldn't recall. I asked her about the tax returns; she couldn't recall. Her testimony contradicted Mr. McAlvanah. Mr. McAlvanah testified that he didn't review any of the documents or any of the records, but Ms. Kwok testified that Mr. McAlvanah gave her the records. So what is it?

Ms. Kwok didn't testify to any damages. She testified she interviewed some consumers, looked at some bank statements. What damages did she show? None.

Mr. McAlvanah was unable to show a finite number of damages. Ms. Kwok did not show any damages. Where are the records? Where are the records showing all of these alleged over-debitings?

Plaintiff's counsel shows you a bunch of e-mails from Mr. Braun about all the over-collecting and the lols. We're not going to sit here and downplay that. Where are those agreements? They didn't link any of those alleged deals to anything in evidence. They didn't link that to any Actum records showing that Mr. Braun over-collected the 16k.

Let's discuss the video.

Again, we will not downplay Mr. Braun's words in the video. I also want the jury to remember that sometimes when you're angry at work, you say things, and sometimes you say things that you shouldn't say. But what's important to remember about that video is that the consumer on the other side acknowledged he owed Mr. Braun the money. He didn't say, you overcharged me. He didn't say, I was underfunded. He just said, I can't pay you. Where is the consumer harm? How was he harmed?

Yes, Mr. Braun said, I'll come spit in your face. I would have completely acknowledged that that's poor language. But where in that video does the consumer seem harmed? And the individual that took that video, Mr. Reich, settled this case for \$675,000. Mr. Braun should not be responsible for \$70 million when Mr. Reich was in the same room. He didn't stop Mr. Braun from speaking to the consumer that way. They probably both laughed at it together. But Mr. Reich got out easy. And the FTC is asking for Mr. Braun to bear the brunt to

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be their headline.

Mr. Giardina testified, who was another owner of the corporate defendants. He testified. Again, it's important to understand that it's the FTC's burden. Their own witness took the Fifth Amendment. They asked for an adverse inference against Mr. Braun for the testimony of Mr. Giardina. We asked for the complete opposite. Everything that plaintiff's counsel asked Mr. Giardina, we asked the negative, and he continued to take the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Braun did not force Mr. Giardina to sign any of these Actum documents, so we ask that any negative inference against Mr. Braun should not be taken.

There is no proof, other than some nasty e-mails that Mr. Braun sent to some of his coworkers that had some foul language. Where are those agreements? That 16k alleged overfunding. Plaintiff's counsel didn't even specify or get any sort of testimony about what agreement or what merchant that even was. The only numbers they have is from someone that worked for them.

I'm not going to sit here and say that Mr. Braun is a nice guy. I'm not going to sit here and say that Mr. Braun didn't say some stupid things. Mr. Braun is not liable for \$70 million. None of the other codefendants settled for anything over a million dollars. They are looking for a headline.

It is important to remember that there were all these

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claims of alleged threatening physical violence. All of these threats -- one video saying I'm going to spit in your face does not equate to \$70 million. It just doesn't.

So, again, I'm not going to sit here and say that Mr. Braun has not said some foul things, whether it was to a consumer in a video, whether it was to his coworkers in an e-mail, but when you deliberate and you look at those e-mails saying I overfunded 16k, lol, just remember, where is that agreement? Where is that agreement? Where are the records from Actum showing the 16 K overfunding? An e-mail is not proof that these things actually happened. The records, the bank records, the Actum records, would actually be the proof that the FTC should have brought, but they didn't.

They could have brought consumers in here to testify as to the actual harm that they suffered, the actual alleged overfunding and under-collecting, but they didn't. brought in the two of their employees and the other codefendants that they settled with that had to cooperate. That's all they brought in.

Another important factor that I want the jury to deliberate about is Mr. Braun's ability to pay. They haven't -- there's no testimony about Mr. Braun's ability to There is no evidence as to his bank records. There's no testimony as to his financial stature. There's nothing. That's their burden; they didn't meet it.

Summation - Mr. DiBenedetto

So when the jury deliberates today, I ask that you return a verdict for Mr. Braun in the amount of \$0. Again, it is FTC's burden to prove consumer harm, and all of these monetary relief penalties — civil penalties, the violation of the GLB Act — where is the proof? Other than some e-mails, it's not there.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, since we're moving with good speed, I think we'll just give you a 10-minute break at this time, and then I will give you my instructions of law. So we'll take a 10-minute break.

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: Okay. Let me say that while occasionally I have been critical of counsel at one moment or another, I thought the summations by both sides were excellent. I thought that they fairly presented to the jury the two very different points of view that are involved in this case. So I commend counsel for a job well done.

All right. We'll take a 10-minute break.

(Recess)

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, each of you now have a copy of my instructions. We are going to read them together but then you can take them with you into the jury room for your deliberations. And if you look at the table of contents, you will see that the instructions are divided into three parts. The first are general instructions, these apply really to all civil cases, then there are the instructions about the specific issues that you need to address in this case, and then there are some concluding instructions about how you fill out the verdict form and things like that. So, let's turn to instruction no. 1.

We are now approaching the most important part of this case, your deliberations. You have heard all of the evidence in the case as well as the final arguments of the lawyers for the parties. Before you retire to deliberate, it is my duty to instruct you as to the law that will govern your deliberations. These are the final and binding instructions which entirely replace the preliminary instruction I gave you earlier.

Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law may be or ought to be, it is your sworn duty to follow the law as I give it to you. Also, if any attorney or other person has stated a legal principle different from any that I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow.

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Because my instructions cover many points, I have provided each of you with a copy of them not only so that you can follow them as I read them to you now, but also so that you can have them with you for reference throughout your deliberations. In listening to them now and reviewing them later, you should not single out any particular instruction as alone stating the law but instead consider the instructions as a whole.

Your duty is to decide the fact issues in the case and arrive, if you can, at a verdict. You, the members of the jury, are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts; you pass upon the weight of the evidence; you determine the credibility of the witnesses; you resolve such conflicts as there may be in the testimony; and you draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you determine them.

In determining the facts, you must rely upon your own recollection of the evidence. To aid your recollection, we will send you all the documentary exhibits at the start of your deliberations. If you want to see the video, please let us know and we will bring you back to court to play it for you. Also, if you need to review any particular items of testimony, we can arrange to provide them to you in transcript or read-back form.

Please remember that none of what the lawyers have said in their opening statements, in their closing arguments,

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in their objections or in their questions is evidence. Nor is anything I may have said evidence. The evidence before you consists of just three things: The testimony given by witnesses that was received in evidence, the exhibits that were received in evidence, and the undisputed facts found by the Court, which you will recall you got in written form as well.

Testimony consists of the answers that were given by the witnesses to the questions that were permitted either here in court or in the depositions that were read into evidence. Please, remember the questions, although they may provide the context for answers are not themselves evidence. Only answers are evidence and you should therefore disregard any question to which I sustained an objection. Also, you may not consider any answer that I directed to you disregard or that I directed be stricken from the record. Likewise, you may not consider anything you heard about the contents of any exhibit that was not received in evidence.

More generally, you should be careful not to speculate about matters not in evidence. Your focus should be solely on the evidence that was presented here in court.

It is duty of the attorney for each side of the case to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence that the attorney believes is not properly admissible. Counsel also have the right and duty to ask the Court to make rulings of law and to request conferences at the side bar out

of the hearing of the jury -- although I don't think we had any side bars in this case. All such questions of law must be decided by me. You should not show any prejudice against any attorney or party because the attorney objected to the admissibility evidence, asked for a conference out of the hearing of the jury, or asked me for a ruling on the law.

I also ask you to draw no inference from my rulings or the fact that on occasion I asked questions of certain witnesses. My rulings were no more than applications of the law and my questions were only intended for clarification or to expedite matters. You should understand that I have no opinion as to the verdict you should render in this case.

You are to perform your duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice or sympathy or hostility as to any party, for all parties are equal under the law. You are to perform your final duty in an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality. You are not to be swayed by rhetoric or emotional appeals. It must be clear to you that if you were to let extraneous considerations interfere with your thinking, there would be a risk that you would not arrive at a true and just verdict. So, do not be guided by anything except clear thinking and calm analysis of the evidence.

As you know, this is a civil case. To prevail in a civil case, a party who is making a claim against another party has what we call the burden of proof which is the burden of

establishing each of the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

"Credible evidence" means such evidence that you find worthy of belief. To establish an element of a claim by preponderance of the credible evidence means to prove that the element is more likely true than not true. When assessing whether a party has met its burden of proof or failed to do so, the question is not which party called the greater number of witnesses or how much time one party or another spent during the trial. The focus must always be on the quality of the evidence, its persuasiveness in convincing you of its truth.

In deciding whether a party meets its burden of proof you may consider both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.

Direct evidence is evidence that proves a fact directly. For example, where a witness testifies to what he or she saw, heard, or observed, that is called direct evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove a fact by proof of other facts. To give a simple example, suppose when you came into the court house today the sun was shining and it was a nice day, but the court house blinds were drawn and you could not look outside. Later, as you were sitting here, someone walked in with a dripping wet umbrella, and soon after somebody else walked in with a dripping wet raincoat. Now, on our assumed facts, you cannot

look outside the courtroom and you cannot see whether it is raining so you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of the facts about the umbrella and raincoat, it would be reasonable for you to infer that it had begun raining.

That is all there is to circumstantial evidence.

Using your reason and experience, you infer from established facts the existence or the non-existence of some other fact. Please note, however, it is not a matter of speculation or quess, it is a matter of logical inference.

The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence, and you may consider either or both and give them such weight as you conclude is warranted.

It must be clear to you by now that counsel for the opposing parties are asking you to draw very different conclusions about various factual issues in the case. An important part of that decision will involve making judgments about the testimony of the witnesses you have listened to and observed. In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and any other matter in evidence that may help you to decide the truth and the importance of each witness' testimony.

Your decision to believe or to not believe a witness

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may depend on how that witness impressed you. How did the witness appear to you? Was the witness, candid, frank, and, forthright or did the witness appear to you to be basic or suspect in some way? How did the way the witness testified on direct examination compare with how the witness testified on cross-examination? Was the witness consistent or contradictory? Did the witness appear to know what he or she was talking about? Did the witness strike you as someone who was trying to report his or her knowledge accurately? These are examples of the kinds of common sense questions that you should ask yourselves in deciding whether a witness is or is not truthful.

How much you choose to believe a witness may also be influenced by a witness' bias. Does the witness have a relationship with any of the parties that may affect how he or she testified? Does the witness have some interest, incentive, loyalty or motive that might cause him or her to shade the truth? Does the witness have some bias, prejudice, or hostility that may cause the witness to give you something other than a completely accurate account of facts he or she testified to?

You should also consider whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the facts he or she testified about, and whether the witness' recollection of the facts stands up in light of the other evidence in the case.

In other words, what you must try to do in deciding credibility is to size up a person just as you would in any important matter where you are trying to decide if a person is truthful, straightforward, and accurate in his or her recollections.

The law permits parties to offer opinion evidence for witnesses who were not involved in the underlying events in the case but who, by education or experience, profess to expertise in a specialized area of knowledge. In this case,

Dr. Dr. Patrick McAlvanah was such a witness. Specialized testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is learned in the field may be able to assist you in understanding the specialized aspects of the evidence.

But your role in judging credibility and assessing weight applies just as much to these witnesses as to other witnesses. When you consider the specialized opinions that were received in evidence in this case, you may give them as much or as little weight as you think they deserve. For example, a specialized witness necessarily bases his or her opinions, in part or in whole, on what the witness learned from others, and you may conclude that the weight given the witness' opinions may be affected by how accurate or reliable that underlying information is. More generally, if you find that the opinions of a specialized witness were not based on sufficient data, education, or experience, or if you

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should conclude that the trustworthiness or the credibility of such a witness is questionable, or if the opinion of the witness is outweighed, in your judgment, by other evidence in the case, then you may, if you wish, disregard the opinions of that witness, either entirely or in part. On the other hand, if you find that a specialized witness is credibility and that the witness' opinions are based on sufficient data, education, and experience, and that the other evidence does not give you reason to doubt the witness' conclusions, you may, if you wish, rely on that witness' opinions and give them whatever weight you deem appropriate.

Applying the general principles that I have just discussed, you must now determine, in accordance with my instructions, whether the FTC has established its entitlement to damages and civil penalties. As I already informed you, the Court previously found Mr. Braun liable for violating federal law, specifically the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the "GLB Act"), by making material misrepresentations about the amount of money that borrowers would receive and the amount of money that the borrowers would have to repay under their merchant cash advance ("MCA") agreements. In addition, the Court has already found that Mr. Braun is liable not only for his own material misrepresentations but also for the material misrepresentations that were made by RCG Advances, LLC; RAM Capital Funding, LLC; Robert Giardina and Tzvi Reich, who I will collectively refer

to as the co-defendants. You must accept these conclusions on liability as settled and binding.

As a result, there are only three remaining issues for you to determine.

First, what is the monetary amount of damages, if any, caused to the borrowers by misrepresentations made to them by Mr. Braun and his co-defendants.

Second, did Mr. Braun know that making these misrepresentations was deceptive or misleading and a violation of the law?

Third, if you find that Mr. Braun so knowingly made these representations, what is the amount of civil penalties that should be imposed on Mr. Braun?

I will now discuss each of these issues in more detail.

The FTC is seeking what are called "damages" for the monetary harm that the misrepresentations caused to the borrower. In particular, the FTC is seeking monetary damages for those MCA agreements to which Mr. Braun and his co-defendants either underfunded, meaning that the borrower received less money than what the borrower was supposed to receive, or over-collected, meaning that Mr. Braun and his co-defendants took more money from borrowers than what the borrowers owed. As you know, it has already been established in an earlier phase of the case that such representations were

made and that Mr. Braun is legally liable for his role relating thereto. However, because of what is called the statute of limitations, the damages are limited to the amount of such monetary harm that occurred during the three-year period between June 10, 2017, and June 10, 2020. Indeed, the FTC is only seeking damages for such harms as occurred between June 10, 2017 and November 2018.

As to the amount of damages resulting from these misrepresentations, the FTC can meet its burden of proof to show monetary damages by putting forward a reasonable estimate of the harm to borrowers. Once the FTC puts forward evidence of a reasonable estimate, the burden shifts to Mr. Braun to show why the FTC's reasonable estimate is inaccurate or unreasonable.

The FTC is also seeking civil penalties. To recover civil penalties, the FTC must first prove that Mr. Braun acted knowingly. "Knowingly" here has two aspects. First, the FTC must show that Mr. Braun knew that material misrepresentations were being made to borrowers with his consent about the amount of money that borrowers were to receive and/or must repay. Second, the FTC must show that Mr. Braun knew or should have known he was violating the GLB Act. The FTC can show the second aspect by proving that Mr. Braun had actual knowledge he was violating the GLB Act or that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have known there was a federal law

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prohibiting deceptive practices in the making of agreements like the MCA agreements.

If you find that the FTC has failed to prove these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must not award any civil penalties. If, however, you find that the FTC has proven these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must calculate the appropriate amount of civil penalties.

Here, because of a different statute of limitations, the FTC is entitled to seek up to \$50,120 for each violation of the GLB Act that occurred between June 10, 2015 and June 10, 2020; but, in fact, the FTC is only seeking such penalties through November 2018. This requires you to determine both how many times Mr. Braun violated the law during this period, and how much to award the FTC per violation. In determining the number of violations, you should consider not just the violations Mr. Braun personally committed but also any violations that were committed by his co-defendants with his consent. In determining how much to award the FTC per violation, which can range anywhere from one cent to \$50,120 per violation, you should consider not only Mr. Braun's culpability but also any other matters that you believe justice may require. You should multiply the number of times Mr. Braun violated the GLB Act by what you determine is the appropriate amount per violation to arrive at total civil penalties.

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should record the final, total amount on the verdict form.

You will shortly retire to the jury room to begin your deliberations. As soon as you get to the jury room, please select one of your number as the foreperson to preside over your deliberations and to serve as your spokesperson if you need to communicate with the Court.

You will be bringing with you into the jury room a copy of my instructions of law and a verdict form on which to record your verdict. Let me pause there.

Ladies and gentlemen, you already saw put up on the screen the verdict form but here it is again. It is a simple, one-page document, that asks you three questions: First, how much do you award in damages; second, whether or not Mr. Braun acted knowingly as I have defined that term; and third, if he did act knowingly, how much you award in penalties.

After you have reached your verdict, your foreperson will sign it, date it, fold it up, and seal it in this envelope very cleverly marked "verdict" and that envelope will be brought to me but I won't open it and read it until you are all back here in the courtroom. And then, after we have read it, I will ask each of you individually whether that is your verdict. And the reason we go through that is to be absolutely sure we have your verdict as you have decided it.

So, back to the instructions.

In addition, we will send to the jury room all the

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documentary exhibits that were admitted into evidence. If you want to see the video, let us know and we will bring you back to the courtroom to see it. If you want any of the testimony, that can also be provided in either transcript or read-back form, but please remember that it is not always easy to locate what you might want so be as specific as you possibly can be in requesting portions of testimony.

Any of your requests, in fact any communication with the Court, should be made to me in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to the marshal who will be available outside the jury room throughout your deliberations. After consulting with counsel, I will respond to any question or requests you have as promptly as possible, either in writing or by having you return to the courtroom so that I can speak with you in person.

You should not, however, tell me or anyone else how the jury stands on any issue until you have reached your verdict and recorded it on your verdict form.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration, with your fellow jurors, of the evidence in the case, and your verdict must be unanimous. In deliberating, bear in mind that while each juror is entitled to his or her opinion, you should exchange views with your fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of jury deliberation — to discuss and consider the evidence, to listen to the arguments of fellow

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jurors, to present your individual views, to consult with one another, and to reach a verdict based solely and wholly on the evidence.

If, after carefully considering all of the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors, you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others', you are not to yield your view simply because you are outnumbered. other hand, you should not hesitate to change or modify an earlier opinion that, after discussion with your fellow jurors, now appears to you erroneous.

In short, your individual must reflect your individual views and it must also be unanimous.

This completes my instructions of the law.

So, any suggestions or objections previously made to the charge are deemed remade at this time and the Court stands by its previous rulings.

So, ladies and gentlemen, let me remind you that you can take as little or as long as you want for deliberations. At about 1:00 we will send in lunch so you can have lunch. The lawyers will be here at all times except between 1:00 and 2:00 when they will have lunch as well. If you haven't reached a verdict by 4:30, you should go home and then come back in the morning at 9:30, and if that happens your foreperson is in charge of making sure that all nine of you are back before you resume your deliberations.

1 (At 2:24 p.m., a note was received from the jury)
2 (Jury present)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

So I understand we have a verdict. In a moment, I'll open the verdict form, but I never comment on the verdict.

That's your job to decide, not mine. But I do want to comment on what a terrific jury this has been. I observed you out of the corner of my eye, and you were all very attentive, very prompt, followed all the evidence. I do have a trial starting in two weeks. It will only last about a month. You don't mind staying for that, do you? Actually, you'll be glad to know you're excused from federal jury service for four years, and that's a reflection of your excellent service. So I thank you again for your service.

Okay. Let's see the verdict slip.

Okay. The verdict is in proper form. I will give it to my courtroom deputy to take the reading of the verdict.

DEPUTY CLERK: Will the foreperson please rise?

As to  $United\ States\ v.\ Jonathan\ Braun,\ you,\ the\ jury,$  award the FTC the following monetary damages from defendant Jonathan Braun. You say?

THE JUROR: \$3,500,000.

DEPUTY CLERK: On the FTC's claim for civil penalties, do you, the jury, find that the defendant acted knowingly as defined in the Court's instructions, yes or no? You say?

1	THE JUROR: Yes.
2	DEPUTY CLERK: Having found that the defendant acted
3	knowingly, you, the jury, award the FTC the following civil
4	penalties. You say?
5	THE JUROR: \$7,500,000.
6	DEPUTY CLERK: Shall I poll the jury?
7	THE COURT: Yes.
8	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 1, is that your verdict?
9	THE JUROR: Yes, it is.
10	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 2, is that your verdict?
11	THE JUROR: Yes, it is.
12	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 3, is that your verdict?
13	THE JUROR: Yes, it is.
14	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 4, is that your verdict?
15	THE JUROR: Yes.
16	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 5, is that your verdict?
17	THE JUROR: Yes.
18	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 6, is that your verdict?
19	THE JUROR: Yes.
20	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 7, is that your verdict?
21	THE JUROR: Yes.
22	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 8, is that your verdict?
23	THE JUROR: Yes.
24	DEPUTY CLERK: Juror Number 9, is that your verdict?
25	THE JUROR: Yes.

DEPUTY CLERK: Jury polled; verdict unanimous.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, and we'll take the verdict form back from you.

So, again, you are now excused for real, with a great thanks of the Court. And I thank you again for your service and also hope you will have a lovely rest of the day, so you can leave now.

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

All right. So the one part of that verdict that is binding on me, of course, is the answer to the second question that the defendant acted knowingly in the way that it was defined. With respect to the other two parts of the verdict, those are advisory, but, of course, I will give them substantial weight, but I'm going to give each side the opportunity to make brief additional submissions on the first item. All I want is any further argument that anyone wants to make. I don't want any additional evidence. The evidence was all submitted.

On the third, the penalties, since there were certain factors that were kept out of this trial for reasons I previously indicated, if someone wants to put in something in the way of evidence with respect to some of the other factors, I will consider it — although, I think you should keep that to a minimum.

For example, I'm already aware of the prior conviction, so you don't need to put in anything on that, you can argue -- I think it's an interesting argument -- of whether I should give any weight to that prior conviction or give meaningful weight to it. As I understand it, but you can clarify this in your submissions, it was a money laundering conviction for which the defendant was ultimately pardoned; is that right?

MR. ASHE: His sentence was commuted.

THE COURT: Or commuted. And it was for money laundering in connection with drugs?

MR. ASHE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, obviously, that was a serious matter, but I'm not sure that it particularly relates to the misconduct that he's now been found liable for here.

So, anyway, I'll be happy to hear whatever anyone wants to say, but you don't need to put in anything of an evidentiary nature.

The one thing that possibly you might want to put in, something of an evidentiary nature, is his capacity to pay. I would like to avoid, if we can, any further hearing on that evidentiary hearing. But maybe a declaration and a response to the declaration.

So initial papers for all that I've just described should be submitted on January 17, limited for the argument to

ten double space pages, and if there are any declarations attached, whatever they are, will be. The response from each side is on January 24, again, limited to ten double space pages.

And I will endeavor to get you a final decision by the end of the month, but I can't guarantee that. I have, as you just heard, another trial going on that's going to take some time. But, certainly, worst case, it will be sometime in February. And then final judgment can, of course, be appealed.

Anything else we need to take up today?

MR. ASHE: Not for the FTC, your Honor.

MR. DIBENEDETTO: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. So I thank counsel again, all counsel, for your help -- even the gentleman who sat a distance on the -- in my view, he's of the far left, but he may prefer to think he's on the far right. But in any way, my thanks to everyone, and I look forward to seeing your papers.

That concludes this proceeding.

(Adjourned)